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À propos de : Tenants, Landlords, and Soil Conservation        

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  • Tenants, Landlords, and Soil Conservation
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  • It has long been argued that tenants tend to overexploit land, but this conventional wisdom has been derived largely without consideration of landlords' actions. We examine what happens when landlords can invest in durable conservation measures in addition to choosing rental contract terms. When tenants are risk neutral, landlords overinvest in conservation under cash rental contracts but can achieve first best levels of output and protection against land degradation when conservation investment is combined with share rental. When tenants are risk averse, the first best is unattainable. In this case, conservation investment combined with share rental results in output levels below the first best, while equilibrium conservation investment may be greater or less than the first best. These results suggest that contract form and conservation investments are likely made simultaneously, so that econometric studies of conservation practice adoption that treat rental status as exogenous are likely subject to bias.
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