Documentation scienceplus.abes.fr version Bêta

À propos de : Central bank communication and output stabilization        

AttributsValeurs
type
Is Part Of
Subject
Title
  • Central bank communication and output stabilization
has manifestation of work
related by
Author
Abstract
  • Central banks around the world have a reputation for being secretive about their operations and market assessments. It is sometimes argued that central banks need flexibility and therefore cannot be fully transparent. We find that this explanation does not carry through in a forward-looking New Keynesian framework, where transparency about the central bank's forecasting procedures improves output stabilization. We also show that higher transparency increases optimal conservatism, as the benefits from higher transparency in terms of output stabilization are greater the more conservative is the central bank.
article type
publisher identifier
  • gpn023
is part of this journal



Alternative Linked Data Documents: ODE     Content Formats:       RDF       ODATA       Microdata