About: Acyclic choice and group veto

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Attributs	Valeurs
type	work Article
Is Part Of	http://hub.abes.fr/springer/periodical/355/1985/volume_2/issue_2/w
Title	Acyclic choice and group veto
has manifestation of work	http://hub.abes.fr/springer/periodical/355/1985/volume_2/issue_2/B921345461542961E053120B220ACEFF/m/web http://hub.abes.fr/springer/periodical/355/1985/volume_2/issue_2/B921345461542961E053120B220ACEFF/m/print
related by	http://hub.abes.fr/springer/periodical/355/1985/volume_2/issue_2/B921345461542961E053120B220ACEFF/authorship/1
Author	Kelsey David
Abstract	Abstract. The Arrow Impossibility Theorem assumes transitivity. Acyclicity is a more appropriate rationality condition for collective decision procedures. Many impossibility theorems for acyclic choice need to assume that there are more alternatives than individuals. In this paper we show that by considering circumstances under which groups (or coalitions) have veto it is possible to prove impossiblity theorems without making such an assumption. Our results extend recent theorems by Blau and Deb, and Blair and Pollak.
article type	OriginalPaper
publisher identifier	BF00437313
Date Copyrighted	1985
Rights Holder	Springer-Verlag
is part of this journal	Social Choice and Welfare

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